Of course they did. They have no interest in protecting your privacy and every interest in making you think they do. I would’ve been way more surprised to learn there wasn’t a backdoor.
I’m left puzzed as to how this works …like… the data on the disk should be encrypted sector by sector…it takes forever to encrypt or decrypt a disk which is consistent with that understanding.
When you boot into PE, I don’t understand how that OS can read anything off the disk, yellowkey or not, without knowing the encryption key…so how does it get that key. Is the vulnerability here that the key is stored in the TPM and win PE can be convinced to retrieve it without the proper credentials being provided ?
If that’s the case, and the TPM can just provide the key on request…then… where is the security here ?
My guess is that the key to decrypt the disk is stored on the disk, encrypted by a Microsoft-known key. This seems to unlock that copy of the key rather than the copy encrypted by your own key.
Though he did say to put the disk back in the original system in part of the instructions, so it might be TPM based. The way to check would be to try this on a system with a disk from another system, or with a wiped TPM.
TPM is not security, it’s security theatre. If you don’t need to type a password in or insert a device with a key on it during boot, then it’s not secure, period.
Of course they did. They have no interest in protecting your privacy and every interest in making you think they do. I would’ve been way more surprised to learn there wasn’t a backdoor.
I’m left puzzed as to how this works …like… the data on the disk should be encrypted sector by sector…it takes forever to encrypt or decrypt a disk which is consistent with that understanding.
When you boot into PE, I don’t understand how that OS can read anything off the disk, yellowkey or not, without knowing the encryption key…so how does it get that key. Is the vulnerability here that the key is stored in the TPM and win PE can be convinced to retrieve it without the proper credentials being provided ?
If that’s the case, and the TPM can just provide the key on request…then… where is the security here ?
My guess is that the key to decrypt the disk is stored on the disk, encrypted by a Microsoft-known key. This seems to unlock that copy of the key rather than the copy encrypted by your own key.
Though he did say to put the disk back in the original system in part of the instructions, so it might be TPM based. The way to check would be to try this on a system with a disk from another system, or with a wiped TPM.
TPM is not security, it’s security theatre. If you don’t need to type a password in or insert a device with a key on it during boot, then it’s not secure, period.